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Not So Perfect: The Disconnect Between Medicare and the Uniform
Commercial Code Regarding Health-Care-Insurance Receivables
I. INTRODUCTION

Imagine that you or your loved one has just been involved in a
serious auto accident. You feel fortunate because you know that one of
the best trauma centers in the city is close by. But the ambulance ride is
taking longer than expected. With the chances of survival lessening
every minute, you hear the ambulance driver tell the paramedics that
they have been asked to divert to another emergency room across town.
The trauma center that was so critical to your future has been
temporarily forced to close its doors to new patients because it is shortstaffed and under-funded.
While this may seem like a scene out of the hit television drama
l
ER, it is a reality in many hospitals across America where medical
2
resources are stretched to the breaking point. Health care providers in
desperate need of financing find it increasingly difficult to obtain the
funds necessary to operate their facilities. Investors' lack of confidence
in health care financing is a primary reason behind this shortage of
funding.4 One solution for restoring lender confidence would be to
5
reconcile the Medicare and Medicaid (Medicare) anti-assignment
1. ER (NBC television broadcast, Sept. 19, 1994).
2.

See CTRS. FOR MEDICARE AND MEDICAID SERVS., HEALTH CARE INDUSTRY MARKET

available at
2003),
14,
(July
21
HOSPITALS
CARE
ACUTE
UPDATE,
CARE
ACUTE
[hereinafter
www.cms.hhs.gov/reports/hcimu/hcimu_07142003.pdf
HOSPITALS] (noting that there has been an increase in credit rating downgrades in the health
care industry for the first part of 2003).
3. Id. Bank consolidations and skepticism by lenders regarding health care borrowers
caused a decline in syndicated loans to the health care industry, from $8.9 billion in 2001 to
$2.7 billion in 2002. Id.
4. See Hearing on Medpac Report on Medicare Payment Policies Before the Health
Subcomm. of the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 108th Cong. (2003), available at
http://waysandmeans.house.gov/hearings (statement of Mary K. Ousley, Chairman,
American Health Care Association) (discussing the bleak financial status of the health care
industry as a whole, pointing out that critical statistics and coverage ratios used by lenders in
evaluating potential borrowers were below the point of acceptability for a majority of the
sector, and stating that one third of the industry is insolvent, causing lenders to have an
overall negative impression of health care borrowers).
5. Health Insurance for the Aged and Disabled, 42 U.S.C. § 1395 (2000). Medicare is
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provisions with the Uniform Commercial Code (the UCC) 6 provisions,
which would allow health care providers to leverage their Medicare
health-care-insurance receivables and the related deposit accounts in a
secured lending transaction.
Part II of this Note compares the UCC's secured transactions
laws to the Medicare statutes, 8 and points out how the two bodies of law
are in conflict with one another on the issue of health-care-insurance
receivables. 9 Part III discusses ways in which a secured lender may
seek to perfect a security interest in Medicare health-care-insurance
receivables and whether or not a secured lender should include the value
of those receivables in the debtor's borrowing base.' ° Part IV discusses
the negative impact that the Medicare anti-assignment provisions have
on the ability of health care providers to obtain financing through
secured lending." Part V proposes either elimination or restructuring of
the anti-assignment provisions of the Medicare statutes enabling lenders
to take assignments of Medicare health-care-insurance receivables as
12
part of the collateral in an asset-based secured financing.

a federal program, established pursuant to the Social Security Act for the purpose of
providing health care to the elderly and disabled. Id. See also Grants to States for Medical
Assistance Programs, 42 U.S.C. § 1396 (2000). Medicaid is also a government program
which provides health care to the poor and is jointly funded by state and federal
governments. Id. Both Medicare and Medicaid statutes contain similar anti-assignment
provisions. See infra notes 39-40 and accompanying text. For convenience all references
herein are to Medicare, although they are equally applicable to Medicaid.
6. U.C.C. § 9-310 (governing perfection of a security interest by filing a financing
statement); § 9-312 (governing perfection of security interests in deposit accounts); § 9-314
(defining perfection by control); § 9-315 (governing security interest attachment in
identifiable cash proceeds); § 9-408 (detailing restrictions on assignments of health-careinsurance receivables); § 9-607 (establishing collection and enforcement remedies available
to secured parties) (2001).
7. See infra notes 179-200 and accompanying text.
8. 42 U.S.C. § 1396(a)(32) (2000); 42 C.F.R. §§ 424.73-74, 424.90, 447.10(a) (2004);
MEDICARE CLAIMS PROCESSING MANUAL, § 30.2.5 - PAYMENT To BANK (June 25, 2004), at

http://www.cms.hhs.gov/manuals/104_claims/Clml04c01.pdf [hereinafter Medicare Claims
Manual].
9. See infra notes 13-52 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 53-157 and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 158-178 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 179-200 and accompanying text.
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HEALTH-CARE-INSURANCE RECEIVABLES: RECEIVING DIFFERENT
TREATMENT UNDER THE UCC AND MEDICARE STATUTES

Health-Care-InsuranceReceivables under the UCC

A new breed of collateral introduced in the 2001 revisions to
Article 9,13 "health-care-insurance receivables"' 4 is considered a subset
of "accounts."' 5 In a traditional secured loan transaction where
accounts receivable are part of the collateral used to secure a loan, the
secured lender files a financing statement 6 to perfect its security interest
in the accounts.' 7 As with other accounts, security interests in healthcare-insurance receivables may be perfected through the filing of a
financing statement.' 8 In addition to perfecting a security interest in the
health-care-insurance receivables, the secured lender may also seek to
perfect its security interest in the deposit account' 9 where the cash
proceeds 20 from the health-care-insurance receivables are deposited
when the receivables are paid.2'
To perfect a security interest in a deposit account as original
collateral, 22 the secured lender must have control of the deposit
account.23 Control is achieved by a secured lender in one of three

13. U.C.C. Art. 9 (2001). Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code underwent a
major overhaul in July of 2001. Id. Among the changes proposed by the National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws were the addition of collateral types
such as health-care-insurance receivables, changes in the requirements of a -financing
statement, changes in the mechanism for perfection of a security interest in deposit
accounts, and changes in the location of filing. Id. The changes to Article 9 have been
adopted by all states with slight variations.
14. U.C.C. § 9-102(a)(46) (2001) (defining the term health-care-insurance receivable).
15. U.C.C. § 9-102(2) cmt. 5 (2001) (describing health-care-insurance receivables as a
subset of "accounts"); see also U.C.C. § 9-102(2) (2001) (defining the term accounts).
16. U.C.C. § 9-521(a) (2001) (establishing the standard form for a financing statement).
17. U.C.C. § 9-310 (2001) (establishing when a financing statement is required to
perfect a security interest).
18. U.C.C. § 9-309 (2001). But see U.C.C. § 9-309 cmt. 5 (2001) (stating that when an
individual assigns a payment under a health-care-insurance receivable to a provider, the
provider's security interest in that receivable is perfected upon attachment).
19. U.C.C. § 9-102(a)(29) (2001) (defining the term deposit account).
20. U.C.C. § 9-102(a)(64) (2001) (defining the term proceeds).
21. See U.C.C. § 9-104 (2001) (describing the requirements for control of a deposit
account).
22. See UCC § 9-314 (2001) (concerning perfection by control); see also § 9-315
(2001) (concerning perfection in identifiable cash proceeds).
23. U.C.C. § 9-314.
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ways: 24 (1) the secured lender may be the depositary bank at which the
debtor maintains the deposit account, 2 (2) the secured lender may
become the depositary bank's customer with respect to the deposit
account, 26 or (3) the secured lender may enter into a deposit account
control agreement.2 7
The secured lender may seek to perfect a security interest in
both health-care-insurance receivables and the related deposit account
into which the debtor deposits the payments made on the receivables,
that is, the proceeds of the receivables.2 8 Unlike perfection of a deposit
account as original collateral,29 the security interest of the lender
attaches to the cash proceeds of the health-care-insurance receivables
when the debtor receives the payment.3 ° A lender does not need control
of the debtor's deposit account in order to have a perfected security
interest in the cash proceeds of the health-care-insurance receivables. 3'
However, in order for the secured lender's security interest to remain
perfected, cash proceeds must remain identifiable and must not be
commingled with other funds.32 In order to ensure that the proceeds
remain identifiable, a secured lender should require a debtor to deposit
the proceeds from Medicare health-care-insurance receivables into an
account separate from the proceeds of non-Medicare health-careinsurance receivables.3 3
24. U.C.C. § 9-104(a) (2001).
25. U.C.C. § 9-104(a)(1) (2001); see also U.C.C. § 9-340 (2001) (distinguishing
between a security interest in a deposit account and a depositary bank's right of recoupment
or set-off). When a secured lender has a perfected security interest through control of a
deposit account, pursuant to U.C.C. § 9-104(a)(3), the depositary bank's right of set-off is
ineffective. U.C.C. § 9-340. Also, the depositary bank, acting as a secured lender, may
have both a security interest and a right of set-off with respect to the same deposit account.
U.C.C. § 9-340.
26. U.C.C. § 9-104(a)(3); see also U.C.C. § 4-401(a), § 4-403(a) (1990) (concerning
bank duties generally).
27. U.C.C. § 9-104(a)(2) (2001).
28. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
29. See supra notes 22-27 and accompanying text.
30. See § 9-315, cmts. 6-7 (2001).
31. Id.
32. See generally U.C.C. § 9-315 (2001). In a financing arrangement where both
Medicare receivables and non-Medicare receivables are used as collateral for the loan, it is
important that the deposit accounts are segregated, because the deposit account for the nonMedicare receivables can be perfected by control. See supra notes 22-27 and accompanying
text. The Medicare receivables deposit account would remain subject to the Medicare antiassignment provisions. See infra notes 73-77 and accompanying text.
33. See supra note 32.
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Despite the best intentions of the drafters of revised Article 9 "to
make it easier to create and perfect Article 9 security interests over a
greater range of assets, ' 34 current federal laws regarding Medicare
payments do little to further this goal with respect to health-careinsurance receivables. In light of the anti-assignment provisions in
Medicare, perfection of security interests in Medicare health-careinsurance receivables offers a meaningless protection, devoid of
remedies.3 5 These anti-assignment provisions prevent secured lenders
from perfecting a security interest in the deposit accounts related to
Medicare health-care-insurance receivables as original collateral 36 and
necessitate the use of a double lockbox arrangement 37 to secure even
identifiable cash proceeds in debtor deposit accounts.3 8
B.

Anti-Assignment Provisions of the Medicare StatutesAffecting
Health-Care-InsuranceReceivables

The Medicare statutes 39 contain anti-assignment provisions
prohibiting Medicare payments from going directly to persons other
than health care service providers.4n In 1972, Congress enacted these
anti-assignment provisions in an effort to eliminate a practice known as
factoring. 41 Factoring agencies purchase Medicare accounts receivables
34. NORTH CAROLINA UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE ANNOTATED WITH COMMENTARY I

(Lexis Publishing, 2000) (quoting JULIAN B. MCDONNELL, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
ANALYSIS OF REVISED ARTICLE 9 (Matthew Bender 1999)).
35. See infra notes 57-62 and accompanying text.
36. See infra notes 73-77 and accompanying text.
37. See generally Delilah Brummet Flaum and Marc L. Klyman, Health Care
Securitization: Structuring Issues and Future Trends (2000), at http://www.
lockbox
double
A
securitization.net/knowledge/transactions/flaum-healthcareclr.
arrangement is one in which accounts receivables are paid into a deposit account belonging
to the debtor (Lockbox 1) from which funds are swept on a daily basis into an account
belonging to the lender (Lockbox 2). Id.
38. See infra notes 78-87 and accompanying text.
39. Health Insurance for the Aged and Disabled, 42 U.S.C. § 1395 (2000); Grants to
States for Medical Assistance Programs, 42 U.S.C. § 1396 (2000).
40. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(32) (2000); see also 42 C.F.R. § 424.73 (2004). It is
permissible for the health care provider to appoint a third party representative to receive
Medicare payments for administrative billing purposes only. 42 C.F.R. § 424.73. This is
not considered an assignment of Medicare payments to the third party. 42 C.F.R. § 424.73;
see also Medicare Claims Manual, supra note 8.
41. See Gregory R. Salathe, Reducing Healthcare Costs Through Hospital Accounts
Receivable Securitization, 80 VA. L. REV. 549, 562 (1994) (discussing the practice of
factoring and the legislative history underlying the enactment of the Medicare and Medicaid
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from health care providers and then serve as collection agents with
respect to those claims. 42 Congress believed that this practice led to
over-inflation of claims and fraudulent behavior as factoring agencies
billed patients for services not rendered or included excessive premiums
in patient bills.43
According to the Medicare Claims Processing Manual, 44 a
health care provider's deposit account into which Medicare payments
are made must be in the name of that provider.4 5 Only that provider is
allowed to give instructions with respect to the deposit account, 46 unless
a court order has been entered directing Medicare payments to be made
to a lender.47 The court order mandating the assignment must be filed
with Medicare and may apply either to all Medicare payments due to a
provider or to a specific amount of money payable to that provider.4 8
The multiple federal restrictions on assigning Medicare healthcare-insurance receivables to third parties places a tremendous obstacle
in the path of a borrower attempting to leverage its health-careinsurance receivables in a secured lending transaction. 49 Lenders who
find it difficult to perfect their security interests in a debtor's Medicare
receivables deposit account, 5° or exercise remedies associated with a

anti-assignment provisions); see also Snowden Inv. Co. v. Sci-Wentzville Care Ctr., Inc.,
896 S.W.2d 732, 733 (Mo. Ct. App. 1995) (discussing how the practice of factoring led
Congress to enact anti-assignment provisions); H.R. REP. No. 92-23 1, pt. 2 (1972), reprinted
in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4989, 5090.
42. See Salathe, supra note 41, at 562.
43. Id.
44. Medicare Claims Manual, supra note 8.
45. Id.
46. Id. (stating that the depositary "bank shall be bound by only the provider's
instructions" and "no other agreement that the provider has with a third party shall have any
influence on the account"); see also 42 C.F.R. § 424.73(a) (2004).
47. See 42 C.F.R. §§ 424.73(a)(2), 424.90 (2004); Medicare Claims Manual, supra note
8; see also infra notes 12 1-148 and accompanying text.
48. 42 C.F.R. § 424.90(a) (2004); see also 42 C.F.R. § 424.90(c) (2004). Secured
lenders should note that once they obtain a court ordered assignment of Medicare payments,
the secured lender and the provider are then jointly and severally liable for any
overpayments made to the secured lender. 42 C.F.R. § 424.90(c). Thus, if the secured
lender is awarded a court ordered assignment of payments, the secured lender may wish to
consider its liability in the event of overpayments made directly to the lender by Medicare.
Setting aside a certain percentage of the Medicare receivables in a reserve account is one
way for the secured lender to accommodate for erroneous Medicare payments.
49. See Salathe, supra note 41, at 549-76 (discussing the negative implications that the
anti-assignment provisions are having on asset securitization).
50. See infra Part III.C.
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perfected security interest in Medicare receivables, 1 may be reluctant to

include Medicare receivables in a health care provider's borrowing
base, reducing the amount of financing the health care provider can

borrow.52
III. PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS FOR LENDERS AND THEIR COUNSEL IN
DEALING WITH SECURITY INTERESTS IN MEDICARE HEALTH-CAREINSURANCE RECEIVABLES AND THE RELATED DEPOSIT ACCOUNTS

A.

Limited Rights Afforded by FinancingStatement

Upon attachment 53 and the proper filing of a financing
statement,54 the secured lender will have a perfected security interest in
the health-care-insurance receivables,55 which, in the case of nonMedicare health-care-insurance receivables, gives the secured lender a
right to notify account debtors to make payments to the secured lender
in the event of debtor default.56 In order to contrast the rights and
remedies accompanying a perfected security interest in non-Medicare
health-care-insurance receivables to those associated with Medicare

health-care-insurance receivables, assume a secured lender files a
financing statement indicating "health-care-insurance receivables from
Blue Cross Blue Shield (BCBS)" as the collateral. 57 The debtor defaults
on the loan, triggering the secured lender's ability to receive payments
directly from BCBS. 58 Any restrictions on the assignment of healthcare-insurance receivables in the provider agreement between BCBS
51. See infra notes 57-62 and accompanying text.
52. See infra notes 155-57 and accompanying text.
53. U.C.C. § 9-203 (2001) (discussing when a security interest attaches to the pledged
collateral).
54. U.C.C. § 9-502 (2001) (specifying that a financing statement must contain the name
of both the debtor and the secured party and an indication of the collateral in order to be
effective); see also, U.C.C. § 9-501 (2001) (instructing as to where the filing of a financing
statement should be made); U.C.C. § 9-310 (specifying when a filing is required for
perfection). But see U.C.C. § 9-309 cmt. 5 (2001) (stating that when an individual assigns a
payment under a health-care-insurance receivable to a provider, the provider's security
interest in that receivable is perfected upon attachment).
55. Supra note 18 and accompanying text.
56. U.C.C. §9-607(a) (2001) (giving the secured lender the right to receive payments
directly from the account debtor, upon the event of debtor default).
57. See generally U.C.C. § 9-102(a)(12) (2001) (defining the term collateral).
58. U.C.C. §§ 9-601, 9-607, 9-609 (2001) (detailing secured lender's remedies upon
debtor default).
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and the debtor will be deemed ineffective under the UCC.5 9 In this
scenario, the secured lender assumes the debtor's position and receives
health-care-insurance payments directly from BCBS.6 °
In contrast, where health-care-insurance receivables are payable
by Medicare, the anti-assignment provisions clearly prohibit secured
lenders from stepping into the shoes of debtors in order to receive
payments directly from Medicare. 61 The secured lender will not be
entitled to assume the debtor's position in order to enforce the secured
lender's security interest with respect to the Medicare health-careinsurance receivables.6 2 The UCC drafters understood that restrictions
on assignments are generally upheld where federal laws, such as the
Medicare statutes, are concerned.6 3 Because the Medicare statutes are
federal law and the UCC represents state law, the doctrine of
preemption dictates that the federal law will control. 64 In recognition of
this fact, the drafters of the revisions to the UCC included a comment
that perhaps the UCC's views on eliminating anti-assignment provisions
could become a template for future federal legislative action.65
B.

The Double Lockbox Strategyfor DepositAccounts

Lacking the ability to exercise remedies normally associated
with a perfected security interest in Medicare health-care-insurance
receivables, a secured lender should explore its ability to perfect a
security interest in deposit accounts into which the debtor deposits
payments received from Medicare. Presumably, once the debtor
receives payment from Medicare, those funds will be deposited with the
59. U.C.C. § 9-408(a) (2001) (describing the general ineffectiveness of private-party
anti-assignment provisions).

60. See U.C.C. § 9-607(a)(1) (2001) (giving the secured party the right to notify the
"account debtor," in this example, BCBS, and demand that future payments be made
directly to the secured lender, bypassing the debtor).
61. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(32) (2000); see also 42 C.F.R. § 424.73 (2004), Medicare
Claims Manual, supra note 8.
62. U.C.C. §§ 9-408(d)(4), 9-408(d)(6) (2001) (establishing situations in which antiassignment provisions are not restricted, such as where there is a conflict between the UCC
and federal law).
63. See infra text accompanying note 65.
64. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1197 (7th ed. 1999) (defining preemption as the

Constitutional "principle (derived from the Supremacy Clause) that a federal law can
supersede or supplant any inconsistent state law or regulation").
65. U.C.C. § 9-408(d), cmt. 9 (2001).
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debtor's depositary bank into a deposit account. 66 Control is the only
UCC mechanism for perfection of a security interest in deposit accounts
as original collateral.6 7
In the case of a deposit account for non-Medicare health-careinsurance receivables, control can be achieved through the execution of
a deposit account control agreement. 68 This agreement - between the
secured lender, the debtor, and the depositary bank - provides that the
receivables are deposited into a deposit account, which may be in the
name of the debtor, the secured lender, or both. 69 The important
element of control exists in these arrangements even though the debtor
may still have access to the funds in the deposit account. 70 The secured
lender will be deemed in control of the deposit account if the depositary
bank agrees to take instructions from the secured lender "without
further consent by the debtor., 71 The secured lender has a perfected
security interest in all funds deposited into the deposit account at all
72
times.
In the case of Medicare health-care-insurance receivables, the
debtor will likely direct Medicare to deposit the payments into a deposit
account. Unlike the typical arrangement where the depositary bank
honors the instructions of the secured lender without further consent
from the debtor,7 3 the deposit account control agreement would specify
that, in the case of Medicare health-care-insurance receivables, the
debtor retains the ultimate right to direct the disposition of funds in the
deposit account.74 Ultimately, the secured lender does not have control

66. See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
67. U.C.C. § 9-312 (2001). But see U.C.C. § 9-315 (2001) (regarding deposit accounts
as cash proceeds).
68. U.C.C. § 9-104(a)(2) (2001) (describing a deposit account control agreement as an
agreement between the debtor, the secured lender, and the depositary bank whereby the
secured lender controls the deposit account through its ability to direct the depositary bank
to take action with respect to the deposit account without the further consent of or
instruction by the debtor).
69. Id.
70. U.C.C. § 9-104 cmt. 3 (2001) (stating that control is still present, even though the
debtor may have access to the funds in the deposit account).

71. U.C.C. § 9-104(a)(2) (2001).
72. See supra note 67 and accompanying text.
73. U.C.C. §§ 9-104(a)(2), (b) (2001) (concerning control of deposit accounts

generally).
74. See 42 C.F.R. §§ 424.73, 424.90 (2004); Medicare Claims Manual, supra note 8.
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of the debtor's Medicare receivables deposit account,75 which is the
necessary element for perfecting the secured lender's interest in the
debtor's Medicare receivables deposit account as original collateral.7 6 If
the debtor declares bankruptcy, the lender will be relegated to the
position of an unsecured lender with respect to the Medicare receivables
deposit account collateral.7 7 Thus, with respect to Medicare health-careinsurance receivables, the secured lender must find a way to secure its
interest in the debtor's Medicare receivables deposit account that does
not involve control of the account.
If the secured lender has a perfected security interest in the
Medicare health-care-insurance receivables themselves, 78 then the
secured lender is automatically perfected in the identifiable cash
proceeds of the Medicare health-care-insurance receivables. 79 Thus,
once Medicare makes a payment to a provider and that payment is
deposited into the designated account of the provider/debtor, the
secured lender's security interest is perfected in the cash proceeds, even
80
though the secured lender lacks control of the deposit account.
In order to move the payments to the secured lender's account,
funds are swept at regular intervals from the debtor's deposit account
into an account belonging to the secured lender. 81 This arrangement, in
which initial payments go into the debtor's deposit account and then
flow into the secured lender's account, is known as a double lockbox
arrangement.1 2 This seems to be a clever way to bypass the Medicare
anti-assignment provisions; yet, unfortunately for the secured lender,
the debtor, which remains in control of its deposit account, can rescind
83
the sweep order at any time, and the depositary bank must comply.
75. 42 C.F.R. §§ 424.73, 424.90, (2004); Medicare Claims Manual, supra note 8.
76. U.C.C. § 9-312 (2001). But see U.C.C. § 9-315 (2001) (regarding deposit accounts

as cash proceeds).
77. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 376 (7th ed. 1999) (defining an unsecured creditor

as one who "takes no rights against specific property of the debtor").
78. See supra notes 53-55 and accompanying text.
79. See U.C.C. § 9-315 (2001) (concerning a secured party's rights to identifiable cash
proceeds).
80. Id.
81. See Flaum & Klyman, supra note 37. The account into which funds are swept is
commonly referred to as a lockbox account. Id.
82. Id.
83. See Mark Spradling, Issues in the Securitization of Health Care Receivables,
HEALTH
LAW
REPORTER,
VOL.
II
No.
47
(2002),
available
at
http://www.healthcenter.bna.com. Lenders and their counsel may want to consider making
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Secured lenders should insist upon a daily sweep84 of the debtor's
deposit account, but must realize that the debtor may divert funds from
the account before the sweep.85 Additionally, if funds become trapped in
the account in the event of debtor bankruptcy,8 6 enforcement problems
87

will arise for the secured lender.
If the debtor, secured lender, and depositary bank agree to allow
the secured lender to control the deposit account, contrary to the

Medicare

anti-assignment

provisions,

the

ramifications

to the

provider/debtor could be severe.88 The Medicare statutes state that the
provider agreement between Medicare and the health care

provider/debtor may be terminated if the provider/debtor "enters into or
continues any... arrangement, that authorizes or permits payment
contrary to the provisions of' the relevant Medicare statutes. 89 Because

Medicare payments account for a significant portion of many health
care providers' receivables, 90 a health care provider/debtor, in
evaluating his or her need for financing, must consider the risk of losing
his or her provider arrangement with Medicare.
C.

Third Party Legal Opinions: What a Lender can Reasonably
Expect from Borrower's Counsel

1. Legal Opinions Concerning Medicare Health-Care-Insurance
Receivables
In a typical financing transaction, the secured lender requests a
recission of a sweep order an event of default under the primary loan agreement. Id. The
possibility of acceleration of the entire loan amount may make debtors less likely to rescind
a sweep order on a deposit account. Id.
84. See generally Flaum & Klyman, supra note 37.
85. See generally U.C.C. § 9-315 (2001). If cash proceeds move on to a third party,
become commingled or otherwise become unidentifiable, the secured lender will lose its
perfected security interest in those funds. Id.
86. 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) (2000). When a debtor files for bankruptcy the court imposes an
automatic stay on all collection attempts by creditors. Id.
87. Id.; see also Flaum & Klyman, supra note 37 (discussing the negative impact that
the automatic stay imposed by a bankruptcy filing can have on a secured lender's interest in
a Medicare health-care-insurance receivables deposit account).
88. See infra notes 89-90 and accompanying text.
89. 42 C.F.R. § 424.74 (2004).
90. AcuTE CARE HOSPITALS, supra note 2, at 10. Government programs accounted for
58% of hospital care expenditures in 2001 totaling approximately $263,107,000,000. Id.
With the aging population, that number is expected to climb. Id.
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legal opinion from the debtor's outside counsel stating that the secured
lender's security interest in the debtor's collateral is perfected. 9'
Though counsel may be in a position to give a perfection opinion with
respect to Medicare health-care-insurance receivables, it is unlikely that
debtor's counsel would be able to satisfy the secured lender's request
for an opinion stating that the secured lender will have effective
92
remedies to enforce its perfected security interest.
With respect to both Medicare and non-Medicare health-careinsurance receivables, if debtor's counsel is satisfied that the security
interest has attached,9 3 and that the financing statement meets the form
requirement and is properly filed,9 4 debtor's counsel will be able to
render an opinion stating that the security interest in health-carereceivables has been perfected, along with the security interest in
identifiable cash proceeds. 95 Secured lenders must remember, however,
that an opinion stating that the security interest in health-care-insurance
receivables is perfected is not equivalent to an opinion that the secured
lender will be able to exercise its UCC remedies in the event of the
debtor's default.9 6
A remedies opinion, on the other hand, is a statement by
debtor's counsel that the agreement between the secured lender and the
debtor is enforceable. 97 In giving a remedies opinion, debtor's counsel
91. See generally The TriBar Opinion Committee, Special Report of the TriBar Opinion
Committee: U.C.C. Security Interest Opinions - Revised Article 9, 58 Bus. LAW. 1453, 1469

(2003) (describing a perfection opinion as a statement of the borrower's counsel that, in her
professional judgment, the lender's security interest is perfected so as to prevail against a
lien creditor).
92. See supra notes 56-62 and accompanying text.
93. See generally The TriBar Opinion Committee, supra note 91, at 1505 n.335
(describing certain necessary elements for an attachment opinion). See also U.C.C. § 9-203
(2001) (regarding attachment).
94. U.C.C. §§ 9-502, 9-503 (2001) (identifying the names of the debtor and secured
party); see also U.C.C. §§ 9-502, 9-504 (2001) (containing an indication of collateral); § 9505 (2001) (establishing filing requirements); §§ 9-301, 9-501 (2001) (designating
appropriate filing offices).
95. See generally The TriBar Opinion Committee, supra note 91, at 1473-74; see also
U.C.C. § 9-315 (2001) (regarding perfection in identifiable cash proceeds).
96. See infra notes 97-100 and accompanying text.
97. See The TriBar Opinion Committee, supra note 95. See also John R. Miller, ThirdParty Legal Opinions In Business Transactions, 2d Ed., Report of the Legal Opinion
Committee of the Business Law Section of the N.C.B.A., 53 (2004) (reporting the standard
content of a remedies opinion to be that "the agreement constitutes the legal, valid and
binding obligation of the company, enforceable against the company in accordance with its
terms").
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should consider whether or not specified remedies will be available to
the secured lender in the event of default by the debtor.98 The remedies
opinion may require qualification,99 given that, in the event of a default
by the debtor, the secured lender would be required to seek a court order
before it is allowed to exercise its rights under the UCC,'0° leaving the
lender without an affirmative statement concerning the availability of
remedies.
2. Legal Opinions Concerning Deposit Accounts as Original Collateral
With respect to opinions concerning a perfected security interest
in the debtor's deposit account as original collateral, the opinion giver
would determine whether or not the applicable standards for achieving
control of the deposit account are met.1 °1 A standard opinion on the
perfection of a security interest in a deposit account, as original
collateral, would state that the security interest in the deposit account
will be perfected upon the execution and delivery by the debtor, secured
lender, and depositary bank of a legally sufficient deposit account
control agreement. 0 2 Because the Medicare statutes prohibit the
secured lender from having control of a deposit account into which
Medicare payments will be directly deposited, 10 3 the deposit account
control agreement regarding these deposit accounts should contain4
language giving the debtor ultimate control of the deposit account.'
Consequently, debtor's counsel would not be in a position to opine that
the lender has a perfected security interest in the debtor's Medicare
receivables deposit account as original collateral, because the element of
control would not be satisfied.'0 5 Without control, the security interest
in the debtor's deposit account would be carved out of the perfection
opinion, leaving the secured lender without a legal opinion regarding its

98. See Miller, supra note 97, at 54 (listing numerous due diligence matters that

debtor's counsel must consider before giving a remedies opinion).
99. Id. at 55.
100. See supra notes 56-62 and accompanying text; see also infra notes 138-42 and

accompanying text.
101. See TriBar Opinion Committee, supra note 95, at 1476.
102.
103.
104.
105.

Miller, supra note 97, at 89.
See 42 C.F.R. §§ 424.73, 424.90 (2004); Medicare Claims Manual, supra note 8.
See supra notes 73-77 and accompanying text.
See TriBar Opinion Committee, supra note 95, at 1476.
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security interest in the debtor's Medicare health-care-insurance
06
receivables deposit account, as original collateral.
3. Legal Opinions Concerning Double Lockbox Arrangement
Without a remedies opinion relating to Medicare health-careinsurance receivables 10 7 or a perfection opinion regarding the debtor's
deposit account as original collateral, 10 8 the lender should ask debtor's
counsel for opinions regarding both the legality of the double lockbox
arrangement' 0 9 and the enforceability of remedies provided in the
related lockbox agreements." 0 Such opinions may provide some
assurance to the lender that its position is secure with respect to the cash
proceeds of the Medicare health-care-insurance receivables."' In order
to give a legality opinion,' 1 2 debtor's counsel would examine applicable
laws, including the Medicare anti-assignment provisions,13 and would
make a determination about whether or not the double lockbox
arrangement violates any applicable laws.' 14 With respect to a remedies
opinion,"' debtor's counsel should determine whether or not the
remedies associated with the lockbox agreement are available to the
106. The Committee on Legal Opinions, Guidelines for the Preparation of Closing
Opinions, 57 Bus. LAW. 875, 878 (2002) (articulating the "Golden Rule" for asking for a
particular third party legal opinion: the recipient should not ask the opinion giver to give an
opinion that she herself would not give in a similar circumstance).
107. See supra notes 97-100 and accompanying text.
108. See supra note 106 and accompanying text.
109. See supra notes 81-82 and accompanying text.
110. Id.; see also Miller, supra note 97, at 66 (describing a practical realization exception
to a remedies opinion as a statement by debtor's counsel that "certain of the remedies
provided under the terms of the Agreement may be further limited or rendered
unenforceable by applicable law, but in our opinion such law does not ... make the
remedies afforded by the Agreement inadequate for the practical realization of the principal
benefits purported to be provided thereby").
111. See generally U.C.C. § 9-315 (2001) (concerning security interests in cash
proceeds).
112. See Miller supra note 97, at 72 (describing a legality opinion as a statement by
debtor's counsel that "the execution and delivery by the [debtor] of the Agreement, and
performance by the [debtor] of its obligations therein, do not violate applicable provisions of
statutory laws or regulations").
113. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(32) (2000); see also 42 C.F.R. § 424.73 (2004); Medicare
Claims Manual, supra note 8.
114. See Miller, supra note 97, at 72-74 (discussing the many exceptions which debtor's
counsel can add to its "no violation of laws" opinion, such as exceptions for specialized
laws, materiality qualifications, or limitations on future occurrences).
115. Supra note 97 and accompanying text.
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Like the
secured lender in the event of default by the debtor.'
health-care-insurance
Medicare
regarding
opinion
remedies
7 the remedies opinion relating to the lockbox agreement
receivables,"
will likely contain many qualifications to account for possible problems
18
As with
resulting from the debtor's actions prior to the daily sweep.
1 9 as they
any other legal opinion, legality and enforceability opinions
relate to the double lockbox arrangement, may not provide the lender
with ideal assurances. However, these opinions may be the only
opinions that debtor's counsel is able to render in light of the remedies
health-care-insurance
and perfection problems associated with Medicare
20
accounts.
deposit
related
the
and
receivables

Judicial Remedies: Convincing the Courts to Honor the Terms
of the Deal

D.

receivables comprise
If Medicare health-care-insurance
collateral for a loan and the debtor defaults, the normal UCC remedies,
such as receiving Medicare payments directly, are not available to a
secured lender. 21 In the event of debtor default, the secured lender
must resort to the judicial remedy provided in the Medicare statutes in
22 Medicare will
order to obtain assignment of Medicare payments.
honor a court order assigning the payment rights to a third party if that
court order is issued by a court of competent jurisdiction and filed with
23
Medicare.
In Missionary Baptist v. FirstNational Bank 124 the Fifth Circuit
116. Supra notes 97 and 112 and accompanying text.
117. See supra notes 97-100 and accompanying text.
118. See supra note 87 and accompanying text. Some examples of the problems which
may arise with respect to the funds in the deposit account are (1) entrapment in the case of a
bankruptcy filing and (2) commingled or otherwise unidentifiable funds. Id.
119. See supra notes 97 and 112 and accompanying text.
120. See supra Parts III.A. and B.; see also Miller, supra note 97, at 75 (discussing

another common opinion known as the "No Governmental Consents or Approvals"
opinion). The "No Governmental Consents or Approvals" opinion is also problematic for
debtor's counsel to give considering that governmental consent, in the form of a court

ordered assignment, is required in order for the lender to exercise its UCC remedies in the
event of debtor default. Infra notes 138-42 and accompanying text.
121.
122.
123.
124.

See supra notes 57-62 and accompanying text.
See 42 C.F.R. § 424.90 (2004); Medicare Claims Manual, supra note 8.
See 42 C.F.R. § 424.90 (2004); Medicare Claims Manual, supra note 8.
Missionary Baptist Found. v. First Nat'l Bank, 796 F.2d 752 (5th Cir. 1986).
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Court of Appeals examined the legislative history of the Medicare antiassignment provisions 25 before determining whether or not Medicare
accounts receivables could be used to collateralize a loan. 126 In this
case, Wilson, acting as trustee in bankruptcy for the Missionary Baptist
Foundation (MBF), argued that the Medicare anti-assignment
provisions invalidated MBF's pledge of Medicare accounts receivables
to First National Bank (FNB) as collateral for a loan. 27 The Fifth
Circuit concluded that to construe the anti-assignment provisions
strictly would be to circumvent the purpose of the Medicare program as
a whole, which is to help the financially needy obtain health care. 128
The court rested its findings on the language in the Medicare statutes, 29
which provides that "nothing in this paragraph shall be construed.., to
preclude an agent of [the provider] from receiving any such
payment." 30 By creating a loose comparison between the lender/debtor
relationship and the agent/principle relationship, the Fifth Circuit was
able to create an exception to the Medicare anti-assignment provisions
and therefore held that FNB's security interest was valid.' 3 '
In Credit Recovery Systems, LLC v. Hieke, 32 the District Court
for the Eastern District of Virginia held that there was no authority for a
court to validate a prior agreement to assign Medicare receivables. 3 3 In
Hieke, Credit Recovery Systems, LLC (CRS) sought to enforce an
agreement pursuant to which Hieke assigned its Medicare receivables to
CRS. 3 4 Pursuant to a settlement with the government over fraudulent
claims and overpayments, Hieke subsequently agreed to waive any
payments from Medicare,1 35 which was inconsistent with its assignment
of Medicare payments to CRS. 3 6 CRS brought the action asking the

125. Id. at 757.
126. Id. at 756.

127. Id. at 755-56.
128. Id. at 757-58.
129. Missionary Baptist Found. v. First Nat'l Bank, 796 F.2d 752, 758 (5th Cir. 1986);
see also 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(32) (2000).
130. Missionary Baptist Found., 796 F.2d, at 758 (emphasis added).
131. Id. at 759.
132. Credit Recovery Sys., LLC v. Hieke, 158 F. Supp. 2d 689 (E.D.Va. 2001).
133. Id. at 696.
134. Id. at 691.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 691-92.
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137
court to validate the assignment agreement with Hieke.
In Hieke, the government, which joined the suit as an
intervenor, 138 argued that the assignment of Medicare receivables was
invalid under Medicare statutes, and the court held that the plain
language of the Medicare statutes prohibited assignments of Medicare
receivables without a court order.' 39 Upon examining the Medicare
1 40
provisions regarding assignment pursuant to a valid court order, the
court held that such an order must be entered contemporaneously with
and not after the assignment in order to validate an existing
assignment. 141 The court reasoned that "the statute pertaining to the
receivables creates a strong
assignment of Medicaid and Medicare
1 42
assignment.
presumption against
In Hieke, the court held that the pledge of Medicare receivables
as collateral for a loan does not "run afoul of any of the federal rules
143
In
relating to the assignment of Medicare and Medicaid claims.
essence, a debtor may pledge its Medicare health-care-insurance
receivables as collateral for a loan, 144 but the secured lender may not
depend on the availability of those receivables should the debtor
default. 45 Using Medicare receivables as collateral for a loan may be
permissible under the Medicare statutes; however, secured lenders may
not wish to secure their loan with the mere possibility of a court ordered
assignment. 146 The secured lender's inability to exercise the remedies
typically afforded by a perfected security interest in health-careinsurance receivables, 147 independent of a court-ordered assignment, and

137. Credit Recovery Sys., LLC v. Hieke, 158 F. Supp. 2d 689, 692 (E.D.Va. 2001).
138. Id.; see also BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 826 (7th ed. 1999) (defining an intervenor
as "one who voluntarily enters a pending lawsuit because of a personal stake" in the
outcome of the dispute).
139. Hieke, 158 F. Supp. 2d, at 696.
140. Id. at 694-95; see also 42 C.F.R. § 424.90 (2004).

141. Hieke, 158 F. Supp. 2d, at 696.
142. Id. (emphasis added).
143. Credit Recovery Sys., LLC v. Hieke, 158 F. Supp. 2d 689, 693 (E.D.Va. 2001).
144. Id.
145. See supra notes 57-62 and accompanying text.
146. See generally Hieke, 158 F. Supp. 2d, at 689-97. The overall affect of the antiassignment provisions, mitigated only by a court-ordered assignment, seems to encourage
litigation. While the remedy of a court ordered assignment is available, lenders and their
counsel may be understandably reluctant to enter into a transaction in which litigation may
be the first and only remedy if a default occurs.
147. Id. at 696. The court in Hieke does not address whether or not CRS had a perfected
security interest in the Medicare receivables. Id.
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the difficulty and uncertainty associated with the related deposit
accounts, 48 should cause secured lenders and their counsel to reconsider
their decision to accept Medicare receivables as collateral.
E.

Limiting Medicare Health-Care-InsuranceReceivables in the
Borrowing Base

Because a secured lender may never have a meaningful security
interest in Medicare health-care-insurance receivables and the related
deposit accounts, 149 the secured lender must determine whether or not to
include the amount of these receivables in the debtor's borrowing
base. 50 The borrowing base is the total value of debtor assets that will
be used to secure the loan.' 5' The loan amount will typically increase
and decrease proportionately with the value of collateral in the
borrowing base. 52 Thus, exclusion from the borrowing base of a
significant asset, such as Medicare health-care-insurance receivables,'5 3
should severely decrease the amount a debtor can borrow. 154
A secured lender considers several factors in deciding whether
or not to include Medicare health-care-insurance receivables in the
debtor's borrowing base: (1) credit-worthiness of the debtor, (2) value

148. See supra notes 75-77 and accompanying text.
149. See supra notes 57-62 and 73-77 and accompanying text.
150. See generally Ira J. Kreft & Allan D. Allweiss, Demystifying Asset-Based Loans,
Fleet Capital CapitalEyes (2002), at http://www.fleetcapital.com/resources/capeyes
(defining borrowing base as a representation of a debtor's borrowing capacity in an assetbased lending transaction).
151. See Colin Cross, Expanding the Borrowing Base with a Tranche B Loan, Fleet
Capital CapitalEyes (2003), at http://www.fleetcapital.com/resources/capeyes.
In assetbased lending, the lender considers the liquidation value of the assets in determining the
borrowing base and includes a safety net of as much as 20% of the loan. Id. Thus, in order
to secure a $1,000,000 loan, a borrower in an asset-based lending arrangement would need
at least approximately $1,200,000 in assets to secure the loan. Id.; see also Kreft &
Allweiss, supra note 150. Typical collateral included in an asset-based lending borrowing
base are accounts receivables, equipment, inventory, and fixed assets. Kreft & Allweiss,
supra note 150.
152. See Robert Rubino, Tried, True and Trusted - A Primeron Asset-Based Loans, Fleet
Capital CapitalEyes (2002), at http://www.fleetcapital.com/resources/capeyes; see also
Cross, supra note 151; Kreft & Allweiss, supra note 150.
153. AcuTE CARE HOSPITALS, supra note 2, at 1. "Medicare is the single largest payor
for hospital care, covering $135 billion or 30% of hospital care expenditures in 2001.
Medicaid paid for an additional $77 billion or 17% of hospital care expenditures in 2001."
Id.
154. Salathe, supra note 41, at 549.
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of assets in liquidation, (3) appreciation and depreciation rates for
assets, (4) requested loan amount, (5) costs associated with liquidation
or foreclosure, and (6) the secured lender's familiarity with health care
financing in general.1 55 The secured lender may ultimately base its
decision on the level of difficulty associated with collecting on or
1 56
The difficulties and
perfecting a security interest in these assets.
uncertainties associated with collection place Medicare health-careinsurance receivables in that category of assets which lenders may, with
good reason, either limit or exclude all together from the borrowing
base.

157

IV. THE FUTURE OF HEALTH CARE FINANCING: How WILL HEALTH CARE
PROVIDERS OBTAIN FINANCING?

Since secured lenders cannot exercise remedies under the UCC
with respect to perfected security interests in Medicare health-careinsurance receivables, and cannot easily secure their position in the
related deposit accounts, health care providers may need to find
58
alternative means of financing their operations.1 One possible solution
could involve using private health-care-insurance receivables as
collateral for a loan, ignoring Medicare receivables in the borrowing
base equation altogether. 159 This seemingly simple solution would be
160
and also raises several public
detrimental to all Medicare providers
155. See generally Cross, supra note 151.
156. Id. (claiming that "assets are often excluded because a lender determines that it
would be difficult to collect or perfect its lien on them").
157. See Nomura Sec. Int'l, Healthcare ABS Primer,NOMURA FIXED INCOME RESEARCH,
at 6 (2002) (suggesting that lenders diversify the assets in the debtor's borrowing base,
possibly capping the percentage of Medicare receivables that are included).
158. AcuTE CARE HOSPITALS, supra note 2, at 18-23. Securitization, public debt and
equity issuances, municipal bond issuance for non-profit hospitals, mergers, acquisitions
and development campaigns are all alternative means for dealing with lack of access to
traditional commercial based financing. Id.
159. See generally Cross, supra note 151 (discussing the possibility of junior secured
financing to fill in the gap between the maximum amount that a senior lender is willing to
provide and the financial needs of the borrower). These types of loans generally carry a
greater risk and consequently a greater potential return for the junior lender. Id. As with all
asset-based loans, the junior lender will still need to evaluate the liquidation value of the
asset in its determination of the provider/debtor's borrowing base. Id.
160. See generally Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services, Highlights - National
Health Expenditures 2002, available at http://www.cms.hhs.gov/statistics/nhe/historical/
highlights.asp (estimating that nationwide Medicare and Medicaid account for $498 billion
of the nearly $1.55 trillion in healthcare spending with private insurance making up roughly
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policy concerns.16' Hospitals located in areas where the population is
predominantly poorer or older may have a disproportionately higher
ratio of Medicare health-care-insurance receivables as compared to their
receivables as a whole. 62 On the other hand, suburban hospitals with
wealthier clientele may have a much higher percentage of non-Medicare
health-care-insurance receivables which they can more easily
leverage. 163 Another factor to consider is that provider participation in
Medicare is voluntary.' 64 If providers found it overly difficult to
leverage their Medicare health-care-insurance receivables in order to
obtain necessary financing, those providers could reduce the number of
Medicare patients who they see or refuse to see Medicare patients at
all. 65 This would obviously have dire consequences for the entire
population and would be in direct contravention to Congressional goal
66
of providing healthcare to the poor and the elderly through Medicare.1
For many health care providers, the last option to accessing
much needed financing may mean turning to questionable lenders ready
to take advantage of the situation. 167 In the fall of 2002, one such
lender, National Century Financial Enterprises, Inc. (NCFE), declared
bankruptcy, 68 taking down with it several of its health care borrowers
and many investors. 169 Prior to its demise, NCFE was one of the largest
health care finance companies in the nation, and was the primary source

$550 billion); Nomura Sec. Int'l, supra note 157, at 2.
161. See infra notes 162-66 and accompanying text.
162. See supra note 160.

163. ACUTE CARE HOSPITALS, supra note 2, at 5 (noting that financially weak hospitals
are getting weaker while well capitalized hospitals are getting stronger).
164. See CMS Provider Manual at http://www.cms.hhs.gov/providers/enrollment/forms
(last visited Feb. 7, 2005). But see Emergency Medical Treatment & Labor Act, 42 U.S.C.

§ 1866 (a)(1)(I), (N) (2000) (prohibiting emergency care facilities from turning away
Medicare patients until they have been stabilized and appropriate transfer can be made).
165. See supra notes 162-64 and accompanying text.
166. Supra notes 5 and 128 and accompanying text.
167. Robert O'Harrow, Jr. & Bill Brubaker, FBI Raids National Century Offices, WASH.

POST, Nov. 17, 2002, at A12 (reporting that health care provider borrowers were required to
pay larger than average fees and interest rates, and in some cases were required to give up
control of their equity, in order to procure the funds needed to continue their operations).
168. See In re Nat'l Century Fin. Enters., 289 B.R. 873 (2003).
169. Michael O'Neal, F.B.I. Raids Headquartersof Health Services Lender, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 18, 2002, at C3; Michael O'Neal, FalloutSpreads After Collapse of a Health Services
Lender, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 21, 2002, at Cl; Michael O'Neal, Behind a Lender's Crash,
Bravado and Risk, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 26, 2002, at C 1.
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of financing for most of its health care provider clients.17 ° NCFE
provided desperately needed cash to health care borrowers in exchange
for the rights to their health-care-insurance receivables, including
NCFE then packaged those
payments due under Medicare.17 '
receivables into bonds which it sold to investors in a practice known as
securitization. 172 The scheme began to unravel as NCFE loaned money
based on future receivables and the debt load became more than many
borrowers could pay. 173 This questionable lending resulted in a
downgrade in NCFE's bond ratings, which caused frightened investors
174
to pull their funds.
In the wake of the NCFE collapse, many health care providers
have also declared bankruptcy, and several others are struggling for
funding. 175 One such provider operating a hospital in one of the poorest
areas of Washington, D.C. is feeling the effects of the lack of funding
and has experienced an inability to care for as many patients, 17a6
room.
reduction in its workforce, and overcrowding in its emergency
NCFE provided financing to borrowers, in exchange for collateral, who
could not have otherwise accessed financing from more traditional
lenders. Given the difficulties inherent in perfecting a security interest
in health-care-insurance receivables, 177 it is difficult to imagine that
traditional lenders will be willing to step in now and pick up the pieces

170. Michael O'Neal, Fallout Spreads After Collapse of a Health Services Lender, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 21, 2002, at C 1.
171. Michael O'Neal, F.B.L Raids Headquartersof Health Services Lender, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 18, 2002, at C3; Michael O'Neal, FalloutSpreads After Collapse of a Health Services
Lender, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 21, 2002, at C]; Michael O'Neal, Behind a Lender's Crash,
Bravado and Risk, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 26, 2002, at C1.
172. Michael O'Neal, F.B.L Raids Headquartersof Health Services Lender, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 18, 2002, at C3; Michael O'Neal, Fallout SpreadsAfter Collapse of a Health Services
Lender, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 21, 2002, at Cl; Michael O'Neal, Behind a Lender's Crash,
Bravado and Risk, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 26, 2002, at C1.
173. Michael O'Neal, F.B.I. Raids Headquartersof Health Services Lender, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 18, 2002, at C3; Michael O'Neal, Fallout Spreads After Collapse of a Health Services
Lender, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 21, 2002, at Cl; Michael O'Neal, Behind a Lender's Crash,
Bravado and Risk, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 26, 2002, at C1.
174. Michael O'Neal, F.B.L Raids Headquartersof Health Services Lender, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 18, 2002, at C3; Michael O'Neal, Fallout Spreads After Collapse of a Health Services
Lender, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 21, 2002, at C]; Michael O'Neal, Behind a Lender's Crash,
Bravado and Risk, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 26, 2002, at C1.
175. O'Neal, supra note 170.
176. Id.
177. See supranotes 57-62 and accompanying text.
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for a financially unstable health care industry." 8
V. CHANGING THE MEDICARE STATUTES

The federal government could prevent both the practice of
secured lenders excluding Medicare
receivables
from the
provider/debtor's borrowing base and the healthcare industry's reliance
on questionable financing arrangements by eliminating the outdated
anti-assignment provisions of the Medicare statutes.17 9 The antiassignment provisions, enacted to curb the abuses of factoring
agencies, 8 ° are no longer necessary in the world of modem lending
practices.' 8 The courts have long recognized that the Medicare statutes
aimed to promote public health and welfare' 82 and that the antiassignment provisions, on their face, are on some level out of step with
this purpose.' 83 Thus, courts have been loosely interpreting the antiassignment provisions in cases such as Missionary Baptist'8 4 while
strictly interpreting them in decisions like Hieke.185 This inconsistency
between the purpose of the Medicare program as a whole, 86 the antiassignment provisions in Medicare, 187 and the courts' interpretations of
the anti-assignment provisions' 88 must be resolved.
Creative lenders and lawyers are already structuring transactions
to leverage Medicare health-care-insurance receivables, for example, by
178. See supra notes 2-3 and accompanying text.
179. Salathe, supra note 41, at 563-64.
180. See supra notes 41-44 and accompanying text.
181. Salathe, supra note 41, at 563-64 (enumerating reasons why the practice of
factoring should not be a concern in asset securitization and suggesting amendments to the
Medicare and Medicaid anti-assignment provisions). In the practice of factoring a nonprovider is charged with collection, whereas in asset securitization the provider continues to
maintain responsibility for collecting payments. Id. at 563. Also in asset securitization the
expected Medicare accounts receivables are well-documented eliminating the concern over
subsequently inflated charges which are the primary abuse in the factoring practice. Id.
Lastly, the quality of the typical asset securitization lender is high and fraudulent behavior
by such a party is deemed unlikely. Id.
182. Missionary Baptist Found. v. First Nat'l Bank, 796 F.2d 752, 757-58 (5th Cir.
1986).
183. Id.
184. Id. at 759 (holding that assignment of Medicare receivables is permissible).
185. Credit Recovery Sys., LLC v. Hieke, 158 F. Supp. 2d 689, 696 (E.D.Va. 2001)
(holding that assignment of Medicare receivables is not permissible without a court order).
186. See supra note 182 and accompanying text.
187. See supra notes 39-48 and accompanying text.
188. See supra notes 184-85 and text accompanying notes 121-48.

2005]

BANKING REGULATION

395

using double lockbox arrangements.189
Legitimizing the use of
Medicare health-care-insurance receivables as collateral by eliminating
the anti-assignment provisions may give even the most cautious of
lenders an incentive to step into the health care financing market.' 90
Permitting secured lenders to exercise remedies associated with a
perfected security interest in health-care-insurance receivables' 9' and to
control a provider/debtor's Medicare deposit account 192 would bring to
the health care sector the kinds of financing options needed to revitalize
93
the industry. 1
If eliminating the anti-assignment provisions is not feasible,
then Congress could redraft the Medicare judicial remedies to allow
courts to validate assignment orders after-the-fact. 94 This would allow
the secured lender and debtor to execute an assignment as a part of the
original loan agreement. Default by the debtor would trigger the
assignment, and the Medicare judicial proceeding would simply serve to
validate the assignment,195 making the assignment of receivables
96
payments a certainty rather than a mere possibility.
If Congress chooses not repeal or modify the anti-assignment
provisions, lenders may consider placing a cap on the percentage of
Medicare health-care-insurance receivables they will accept as collateral
as compared to the overall borrowing base value from health care
provider/debtors. 97 Capping would enable providers to leverage a
portion of their Medicare health-care insurance receivables while
providing secured lenders with a portion of collateral not considered to
be problematic. 198 This option falls far short of eliminating the antiassignment provisions and allowing for the unrestricted use of Medicare
health-care-insurance receivables as collateral and raises the same
189. See generally Flaum & Klyman, supra note 37; Spradling, supra note 83; Nomura
Sec. Int'l, supra note 157.
190. See Nomura Sec. Int'l, supra note 157, at 5.

191. See supra notes 57-62 and accompanying text.
192. See supra notes 73-77 and accompanying text.
193. See generally Ousley, supra note 4.

194. See generally Credit Recovery Sys., LLC v. Hieke, 158 F. Supp. 2d 689, 696 (E.D.
Va. 2001) (holding that assignments of Medicare receivables cannot be validated after-thefact).
195. Id.
196. Id.

197. Supra note 157 and accompanying text.
198. Id.
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public policy considerations discussed in Part IV of this Note.' 99 If
secured lenders are only willing to accept a certain percentage of
Medicare health-care-insurance receivables as collateral, it is likely that
all health care providers will be hurt and especially poorer hospitals
who may be more Medicare dependent than wealthier facilities.2 °°
VI. CONCLUSION

Current Medicare anti-assignment provisions dictate a
conservative approach by lenders and their counsel which may result in
limiting or excluding significant receivables assets from a debtor's
borrowing base.2 ' Leaving these valuable assets on the table is making
an already depressed health care financing market even more vulnerable
to financial distress.20 2 The most unfortunate result is poor patient care
and outdated medical facilities.20 3
Patients pay the highest price for the disconnect between the
UCC and the Medicare statutes. Whether by lack of access or higher
medical costs, we will all eventually feel the effects. Changing the
Medicare statutes to clearly allow secured lenders to perfect their
security interests and exercise their rights pursuant to valid security
interests in Medicare health-care-insurance receivables will help
provide health care facilities with the funds needed to better serve us all.
By endowing Medicare health-care-insurance receivables with the
normal remedies afforded under the UCC, Congress can provide
adequate protection to financial institutions, which in turn will provide
the funds needed to revitalize the health care industry and improve
patient care.
KIMBERLY EASTER ZIRKLE

199. Supra notes 158-66 and accompanying text.
200.
201.
202.
203.

Id.
See supra notes 149-57 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 2-4 and accompanying text.
See supra note 122 and accompanying text.

